{
  "product": "ABCP",
  "version": "2.8",
  "origin": "https://agent-control.noetfield.com",
  "contact": "operations@noetfield.com",
  "note": "Paste-ready answers for bank/fintech vendor questionnaires. Not a certification.",
  "answers": [
    {
      "id": "what_are_you",
      "q": "What product are you proposing?",
      "a": "Agentic Banking Control Plane (ABCP): an assurance layer that governs agent-initiated payments and account actions (identity, policy, limits, confirm, verify, signed receipts) before value moves on licensed partner rails. Not a chartered bank. Not a money transmitter."
    },
    {
      "id": "money_transmitter",
      "q": "Are you a money transmitter or deposit-taking institution?",
      "a": "No. Licensed partners move value. ABCP assures agent decisions and emits tamper-evident receipts. Public surface does not move money."
    },
    {
      "id": "soc2",
      "q": "Do you have SOC 2 Type II?",
      "a": "Not certified on the public Trust Center. We publish an honest TSC readiness map and control questionnaire. Formal Type II materials are a contracted diligence track under NDA — we do not claim a certificate we do not hold."
    },
    {
      "id": "pentest",
      "q": "Can you provide a penetration test report?",
      "a": "Public pen-test scope for agent-money paths is published. Full independent reports are shared under NDA when an engagement exists for the contracted environment. We do not publish fabricated findings."
    },
    {
      "id": "refs",
      "q": "Can you provide customer references?",
      "a": "Named references are not listed publicly. After mutual NDA and fit confirmation, we arrange a reference call. Pilot capacity is limited to two slots per quarter."
    },
    {
      "id": "kill_switch",
      "q": "How do you stop a compromised agent?",
      "a": "Admin suspend-agent fails closed immediately for that agent_id and invalidates pending confirms. Evidence: control catalog id kill_switch + /security threat model."
    },
    {
      "id": "dual_control",
      "q": "What requires dual control / second factor?",
      "a": "Above-threshold payments and revoke-class tools require a bound, single-use confirm token issued outside the model turn. Confirm tokens are not replayable."
    },
    {
      "id": "audit",
      "q": "How do we get examiner-ready evidence?",
      "a": "Every money-adjacent decision emits a receipt (receipt-money-v1). Accepted outcomes require required checks to pass. Receipts are Ed25519-signed; public verify example and schema are on banking.noetfield.com."
    },
    {
      "id": "injection",
      "q": "How do you handle prompt injection into payment tools?",
      "a": "Allowlisted tools + JSON Schema (additionalProperties false) before side effects, plus sec.money_v1 inject cases in CI. Fail-closed on policy/schema/confirm failure — never soft-accept."
    },
    {
      "id": "data",
      "q": "What sensitive data appears in logs?",
      "a": "Receipts/logs may retain tool name, amounts in minor units, currency, partner_ref, outcome, check IDs. They must not retain PAN, CVV, full account numbers, bearer tokens, or private keys."
    },
    {
      "id": "eval",
      "q": "How do we test our gateway before pilot?",
      "a": "Run sec.money_v1 (pip install agent-security-bench) or request a free one-week score on redacted agent logs via /scorecard. Public fixtures: clean / failing / partial."
    },
    {
      "id": "attestation",
      "q": "How do we verify this Trust Center was not swapped?",
      "a": "Fetch /attest.json — an Ed25519-signed posture attestation bound to doctrine version, origin, verify public key, and hard boundaries (not a bank / not MT). Verify with the published SPKI key."
    }
  ]
}